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Building a Boundary Object:  
The Evolution of Financial Risk Management 
 
 
Yuval Millo and Donald Mackenzie1 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper traces the intertwined evolution of financial risk management and the 
financial derivatives markets. Spanning from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, this 
paper reveals the social, political and organizational factors that underpinned the 
exponential success of one of today’s leading risk management methodologies, the 
applications based on the Black-Scholes-Merton options pricing model. Using 
empirical data collected from primary documents and interviews, the paper argues 
that the remarkable success of today’s financial risk management should be attributed 
primarily to the communicative and organizational aspects of the methods rather  
than to their accuracy or validity. The analysis claims that financial risk management 
became a boundary object – a set of instructions and practices that served as a 
common ground and as a basis for discussion and operation despite having quite 
different meanings to the different communities of practice involved. As risk 
management became an integral part of common organizational market practices 
(e.g. margin calculation and intra-portfolio coordination) the actual content of the 
predictions that risk management systems produced became less relevant. In fact, a 
seemingly paradoxical shift took place: as the consensus around risk management 
systems was established, the accuracy and validity of the predictions produced by 
them became less important. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The authors thank Daniel Beunza, Asaf Dar, Stephen Dunne, Manu Haven, Peter 
Levin, Geoff Lightfoot, Simon Lilley, Roi Livne, Andrea Mennicken, Peter Miller, 
Fabrizio Panozzo, Martin Parker, Mike Power, Alex Preda, Nick Prior, Uri Schweid, 
David Stark, Balázs Vedres, Dani Vos, Josh Whitford, Yuval Yonay and Ezra 
Zuckerman for their helpful comments.  We also thank participants in seminars at the 
London School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, Università Ca’ Foscari, 
Columbia University, University of Haifa and University of Leicester where earlier 
versions of this paper were presented. We would also like to thank the anonymous 
CARR referees.  Special thanks go to Amy Greenwood for her precise and swift 
editing. All remaining mistakes are, of course, ours.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Correspondence: Yuval Millo, Department of Accounting, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE. (y.millo@lse.ac.uk). 
 2 
Introduction  
 
Financial risk management has become a ubiquitous feature of financial markets, 
but nowhere more so than in the markets for financial derivatives. The connection 
between financial risk management and financial derivatives is both conceptual 
and historical. The link between the two is conceptual because financial 
derivatives have been envisioned and introduced as market-based risk 
management tools, aimed at distributing risk among market participants. Financial 
derivatives allow those who wish to reduce the risk embedded in their market 
positions and to transfer it (i.e. sell it) to others who are interested in bearing more 
risk, in expectation for increased return. Derivatives contracts are designed to 
capture, quantify and trade risks embedded into a variety of phenomena. In effect, 
financial derivatives market are markets for risk, as risk is defined, qualified, 
packaged and re-distributed in these markets. The link between contemporary 
financial risk management and financial derivatives is also historical. The 
derivative market on which this paper is focused, the first organized exchange for 
the trading of financial derivatives, was also the focal point around which one of 
today’s leading financial risk management methodologies developed. The 
American stock options exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), 
was a ‘natural laboratory’ where the option pricing models of Black and Scholes 
(1972, 1973) and Merton (1973) were tested.2  
 
If, as the conceptual and historical links imply, financial risk management and 
financial derivatives are twins, born and raised in the same metaphorical 
household (the derivatives exchanges) then how should we understand their 
spectacular growth? In a recent book about the evolution of risk management, 
Michael Power (2007) traces the evolution of risk management as an 
organizational phenomenon. Power claims that the explosive growth of risk 
management in the last two decades is related to a gradual convergence between 
risk calculation and risk management. This historical process eventually led to a 
subsuming of the former into the latter. That is, nowadays risk is regarded as a 
manageable factor rather than merely a measurable, quantifiable and calculable 
entity. In other words, risk has been ‘internalized’. Organizations re-positioned 
themselves vis-à-vis risk; they moved from being spectators at an external 
phenomenon to managers of an increasingly inherent corporate resources.   
 
This paper explores and analyzes one of the important starting points in this 
process: the evolution of financial risk management in derivatives exchanges. The 
growth of financial risk management is underpinned by the transformation 
undergone by risk assessment techniques. Mathematical ‘price finders’, trading 
aides for the individual trader, were transformed into institutionalized and 
indispensable managerial coordination tools. This phenomenon in itself deserves 
sociological and historical analysis. Yet, within this general historical trend, a 
more subtle institutional change was taking shape.  As risk management turned 
into an integral part of common organizational market practices (e.g. margin 
calculation and intra-portfolio coordination), the actual content of the predictions 
that risk management systems produced became less and less relevant. In fact, a 
seemingly paradoxical shift was taking place: as the consensus evolving around 
management systems established, the accuracy and validity of the predictions 
produced by them became less important.  
                                                 
2 For a detailed account of the interdependency between the evolution of the options market and 
the economic model  see: MacKenzie & Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2006. 
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Financial risk management and boundary objects  
 
In the last ten years, we witnessed a growing interest in the social and institutional 
dimensions of financial markets and their structure and operation (Baker, 1984; 
Abolafia, 1996; Zuckerman, 1999; MacKenzie 2001; Brügger & Knorr-Cetina, 
2002; MacKenzie & Millo 2003; Beunza & Stark 2004). Yet, apart from notable 
exceptions discussed in the paper, this interest in financial markets has so far not 
been expanded to the study of financial risk management and the evolution of this 
important techno-social institution. The emergence of risk management 
introduced new practices to the markets and contributed to the creation of 
interrelated communities of practice. Indeed, by focusing on the transformation 
from assessment of financial risk to financial risk management, we highlight a 
practice-related dimension of the historical process and its communicative 
aspects. The change in the risk-related practices from essentially calculative 
processes to managerial ones also entailed a transformation in the role of risk and 
risk predictions as a communicative medium. As risk management gradually 
became a central organizational praxis, risk-based communication and risk-based 
coordination emerged and crystallized.  
 
To see how an analysis of financial risk management can enrich our 
understanding of cooperation in markets, we need to refer to previous works 
regarding coordination and co-operation in financial markets. Following Polanyi’s 
work (Polanyi & MacIver, 1957), one of Mark Granovetter’s (1985, 1992) 
fundamental theoretical claims is that markets should be regarded as social 
constructions that evolve on the basis of pre-existing social and cultural 
frameworks, in which markets are ‘embedded’ and  are not necessarily economic. 
Hence, the evolution of economic institutions takes place through continuous 
interactions among actors who hold a variety of motivations and worldviews. 
Granovetter’s central concept – the embedding of markets in pre-existing socio-
cultural frameworks – focused on the resulting economic structures. Other 
economic sociologists such as Mitchell Abolafia (Abolafia, 1996), Wayne Baker 
(Baker, 1984) and Brian Uzzi (Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi & Gillespie 2002; Uzzi & 
Lancaster, 2003), who built upon Granovetter’s theoretical perspective, studied 
the interaction of a variety of individual actors in financial markets. Abolafia’s 
research about the New York Stock Exchange showed that the common view of 
the financial trading world as an atomistic, egoistic, profit-driven social 
environment was far from accurate.  Market participants frequently created social 
networks and very seldom operated alone.  These networks imposed unwritten 
(but carefully guarded) rules of reciprocity.  For example, a trader who failed to 
‘give back a trade’ (i.e. partake in a non-profitable exchange with a fellow trader 
who previously had done so for them) risked being excluded from the trade 
circles.  Baker, who studied an options exchange, found that traders tended to 
operate within more or less a set network of trading associates. This stream of 
empirical works demonstrated persuasively that fundamental elements 
underpinning market behaviour are regulated through dense personal networks of 
crisscrossing favours and animosities, which then feed into equally elaborate sets 
of closely guarded norms.  
 
In particular, the work on the embedding of social networks and their role in 
markets tells us that we need to look for a theoretical perspective that combines 
action and structure when we conceptualize the evolution of financial risk 
management, rather than a theoretical framework that traces primarily the 
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formation of structures. When the ‘embeddedness approach’ is represented in 
terms of historical processes, two preliminary premises emerge. First, financial 
risk management did not evolve in a linear fashion, but rather in a network-like 
one. That is, the various market participants did not form an ‘assembly line’ where 
one actor operated after the other, each contributing to the final shape of the 
system. Instead, the evolution process unfolded through continuous simultaneous 
interactions without the presence of a meaningful command and control centre. 
Second, inherent to the interactive and networked nature of the historical 
evolutionary process is the heterogeneity of the actors involved. As they interact, 
the various market participants promote different, even conflicting, operative 
agendas, each rooted in a different worldview. Hence, the overall environment 
where financial risk management evolves should be regarded as a heterogeneous 
network.  
 
Albeit being relevant to the development of a theoretical framework, inter-
personal networks reveal only a partial picture of the story of financial risk 
management. First, the empirical research that followed the ‘embeddedness 
approach’ focused on collecting contemporaneous data (participant observation 
and quantitative analysis) from which the empirical conclusions were drawn. As 
useful as this approach is in revealing how inter-personal connections frame and 
configure economic ones, the longer-term processes of institutionalization by 
which patterns of network-based coordinated action become part of the market’s 
infrastructure are not likely to be captured by such methodological tools. In 
contrast, the historical sociology perspective applied in this research, using both 
oral history methods (interviews) and primary documents, is geared towards the 
analysis of longer historical durations and assessing their impact on organizational 
structures. In fact, the empirical evidence and the historical analysis in the paper 
show that a ‘snapshot’ view of any one point in time during the twenty-year 
period analyzed in the paper could have led to mistaken conclusions about the 
way financial risk management evolved.   
 
Another area where the ‘embeddedness approach’ can be enriched is by taking 
into account the role of non-human actors in the shaping of financial risk 
management. Financial markets are commonly described as an environment 
saturated in sophisticated technological artefacts. These are an indistinguishable 
part of today’s financial market: printouts of calculations, display screens and 
trading floor workstations.   However, less common is a realization of the part that 
technology plays in shaping the structure of markets. In a beautifully written 
paper, Kalthoff (2005) shows how practices that evolved around the use of 
computer software (‘epistemic practices’) crystallized institutional risk 
management routines. Kalthoff’s findings reveal that practices did not emerge 
primarily from simple inter-personal interaction, but that coordinated 
communication was mediated by technical representations of risks and through 
that mediated representation risk management evolved and was established. A 
recent paper by Miller and O’Leary (2007) draws similar conclusions regarding 
the role that materiality played in the growing efficacy of capital budgeting. Miller 
and O’Leary argue persuasively that the efficacy of heterogeneous networks as 
agents of constitutive change is dependent on their ‘intermediaries’, the material 
content (e.g. written documents, technical artefacts, money) that circulates in the 
network and embodies, in effect, the connections among the actors.  
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The hybrid human-machine networks through which financial risk management 
evolved is tightly related to the ‘facticity’ of risk management: the ability of risk 
management systems to produce results that would be perceived as valid and 
accurate descriptions of a reality (Latour, 1988). In a forthcoming book, Donald 
MacKenzie argues that the production of prices in financial markets is inherently 
embedded in the production of validity for those prices. That is, markets have to 
maintain the legitimacy of their prices as factual descriptions of the tradable 
values of the assets exchanged in the market. That ability, as the analysis below 
aims to show, is critically dependent on the creation and maintenance of  a 
technology-driven, widely acceptable non-contextual set of descriptors. For 
example, a portfolio manager would find it difficult to trust the figures her risk 
management software produces if she believed that those figures were valid only 
for the specific set of circumstances in which they were produced. On the other 
hand, if the same portfolio manager had trusted that her risk management software 
‘speaks’ in a universal language and thus her level of calculated risk is 
comparable with those of others who use the same risk methodology, then it 
would be easier for her to assign a high degree of validity to the results. It is true 
that such a detachment between the contextual (and less valid) and the universal 
(and therefore more valid) informational items can be created, hypothetically, 
without the presence of machine. Nonetheless, done manually, such a process 
would have practically paralyzed the market’s activity. As the historical case 
shows repeatedly, inhuman speed and efficiency were the factors that kept the 
‘facts machine’ of financial risk management running smoothly.   
 
Referring to financial risk management as a set of institutionalized techno-social 
practices brings to the fore the communicative aspect of risk management. If, as 
Power claims, a major transformation has turned risk calculation into risk 
management then an empirical examination should reveal organizational actors 
that direct more resources to communicating and coordinating action using risk 
management and pay relatively less attention to calculating risk levels. This 
communicative aspect of risk management also has reflexive and constitutive 
implications. Risk management allows market participants to produce a map of 
risks and opportunities from which a plan of action could be derived. Naturally, 
any map, be it a geographical map or a risk map, is charted while incorporating a 
particular perspective. That is, an actor’s point of view is the initial coordination 
according to which risks are defined and risk assessments are made. Therefore, 
the way an organizational actor depicts its risks is contingent upon how that actor 
perceives itself, its goals and its relationships with other actors. Consequently, 
since risk management is not only a description of a given reality but includes a 
prediction and is operated upon as a blueprint for action, it includes a constitutive 
(or performative) element. The way organizations depict their risks has a 
significant effect on the way they will react to events and to other actors. Over 
time, an influential risk management scheme (and, as we will see, financial risk 
management became significantly influential) will bring about institutionalized 
patterns of risk embodiment.  
 
So far, we presented the analytical layout of how risk management can serve as a 
managerial tool. However, to theorize how financial risk management became 
such a dominant factor, our theoretical frameworks needs to be able to answer the 
following question: why did a particular risk methodology become successful 
while others did not? More specifically, can a general set of conditions be 
identified that would determine the likelihood of a particular financial risk 
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management system becoming successful? A potential candidate for such a 
theoretical framework is the concept of boundary objects. The notion of boundary 
objects was used first by Leigh Star and Griesemer (1989) to describe artefacts, 
procedures, concepts or realms of knowledge that served as joint reference points 
accepted by different groups in spite of the fact that each group may have 
different cultures and beliefs, including radically different understandings of the 
objects in question.  In a later publication, the influential book Sorting Things Out, 
Bowker and Leigh Star (1999) present a more general version of the boundary 
object concept and use it to analyze classificatory systems, trace the ways through 
which they were embedded into organizational infrastructures and eventually 
become part of the taken-for-granted organizational reality. Using detailed case 
studies, Bowker and Leigh Star describe how the networks of connections both 
within organizations and among them created and legitimized rules and practices; 
they define a boundary object as an object that can facilitate communication 
among ‘several communities of practice and satisfy the informational 
requirements of each of them. Boundary objects are both plastic enough to adapt 
to local needs and constraints, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity 
across sites’ (1999: 297). 
 
This description fits remarkably well with the conditions that surrounded financial 
risk management in the early derivatives markets. There, the different market 
participants held widely varying perceptions with regard to risk, from which 
different needs and constraint were derived.  Under such conditions, for a 
boundary object to serve as a basis for co-operative communication among the 
groups, it would have to include representations that correspond with the different 
perceptions. As we shall see, financial risk management evolved into such a 
‘plastic’ representation, that it is able to accommodate the conflicting 
organizational demands while maintaining a common, universal ‘risk language’. 
Schematically, there existed three types of market participants in the case: traders, 
regulators and clearing bodies, each holding a different set of conceptions, 
expertise and agendas to promote and consequently, each regarded financial risk 
differently from the others. For example, for the majority of traders, risk was 
manifested by adverse movement in prices. In contrast, the securities regulator 
saw risk as the possibility of brokers’ customers suffering inadvertent losses 
because of their involvement in their broker’s positions. Yet another perspective 
on risk was held by the clearinghouse; there, risk was embodied in the possibility 
that traders would not make good their part of the financial contracts - leaving the 
clearinghouse to pay.   
 
The above examples point at several aspects where the case of financial risk 
management can enrich the existing concept of boundary objects. First, the 
commonly acceptable concepts related to financial risk management needed to 
include detailed instructions for the active management of risk.  This requirement 
rules out as explanatory factors boundary objects of the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ type: objects that only describe, but do not offer a plan for action. 
Second, the strength of boundary objects in options market derived from the fact 
they provided each of the participants with a plan for risk management that suited 
their particular preferences. Third, because market activity demanded continuous 
use of risk management techniques, the efficiency of boundary objects was 
constantly tested.  Again, the ability of risk management techniques to bridge over 
differences was tested each time a decision was made.   
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The dynamic and iterative nature of financial markets calls for an expansion of the 
initial boundary object concept.  Duncker and Disco (1998) and Duncker (2001) 
describe several stages in the development of a communicative medium in a 
setting of an interdisciplinary research project where the accuracy of the boundary 
objects (how well they ‘translate’ information from one expertise to another) was 
rigorously tested.  The testing stages formed a consecutive development of 
communication between different groups and facilitated deepening levels of co-
operation among them.  The stages illustrate a growing dependence on the 
evolving communicative medium by all participants up to the final stage, that of 
‘hybrid repertoires’ when the only effective mean of efficient communication 
among the actors about the project was the set of joined repertoires. As financial 
risk management gradually became the universal means of communication among 
market participants, it also gradually transformed from a descriptive language to a 
constitutive one. Namely, there was simply no other way to assess risk and act 
according to that assessment without using the risk management language.  At 
that stage, discussed in the last section of this paper, the dependence on the 
boundary object was so profound that the communicative and organizational 
efficacy of the risk management system were as important as the accuracy and 
reliability of the predictions it provided.   
 
Before we analyze in detail the history of financial risk management in derivative 
markets, it will be helpful to characterize generally the different forces that were 
at play. Much of the historical period described in the paper is characterized by 
rapid growth in the popularity of exchange-traded stock options and in growing 
volumes of options trading. This growth was related to three processes. First, as 
volumes grew, trading practices and techniques changed in order to accommodate 
the increasing number of trading orders. In addition, the complexity of trading 
practices grew and the division of labour within the trading firms gradually 
became more pronounced and the different roles more specialized. Second, the 
risk- and price-evaluation methods used in trading were adapted to the more 
varied trading environment and became increasingly dependent on mathematical 
risk management. Third, the markets’ infrastructure, and especially options 
clearinghouses, having to cope with both growth in volumes and increasing 
complexity in trading practices turned to mathematical pricing models for a 
solution. Table 1 describes the three facets of the period: 
 
Table 1: Periods in the history of financial risk management in options 
exchanges  
 
 Trading /clearing 
Practices 
Risk management 
tools 
Institutional 
structure of the 
Market 
1973 – 1975  Single traders, 
scalping 
Sheets with 
calculated prices 
CBOE is the only 
options exchange  
1976 – 1984 Inter-market 
distributed portfolios; 
Margins calculated 
using  strategy-based 
method 
Spreading, daily 
trading strategies 
using pricing models.  
Options traded in 
several exchanges 
1985 – 1987  Index tracking; 
dynamic portfolio 
insurance 
Margins of Non-
Equity Options 
(NEO) calculated 
using pricing model 
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October 1987 Under extreme volatility, Black-Scholes-
Merton-based applications are not accurate 
International order 
books for derivatives 
1988 – 1994   Testing of model-
based application for 
net capital 
requirements 
(TIMS), approved by 
SEC in 1994 
Theoretical prices 
and volatility on 
CBOE display 
boards 
 
 
Risk assessment practices in early CBOE 
 
Brief explanations about financial options and the mathematical model used in 
options market (the Black-Scholes-Merton  model) are necessary before 
presenting the historical findings. Options give their buyers the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy (“call option”) or to sell (“put option”) a certain asset at a set 
price on (or before) a given future date. Sellers of options take upon themselves 
the obligation to sell the assets at the set price or to buy them at a set price if the 
buyers decide to exercise the options. By buying a put option, a trader can protect 
him/herself from the possibility of prices dropping. Similarly, by selling options, 
different traders can be paid for taking upon themselves other traders’ risks.  
 
Without delving too deeply into the theoretical background of the Black-Scholes-
Merton model, a few points about it should be explained. It is a mathematical 
pricing model that can be used to predict options contracts’ prices (Black and 
Scholes 1972; Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973). Alternatively, knowing the 
present price of a contract, one could use the formula to evaluate how risky a 
certain market position is.3 This is how the Black-Scholes-Merton model is used 
to estimate the prices of options.  First, the amount of option and stock that 
compose a risk-free portfolio is calculated.  Then, since the cash flow generated 
by this portfolio is identical to the one generated by an interest-bearing account, it 
is assumed that the prices of the two equal portfolios would also be equal.  This 
procedure produces two important results.  First, the formula returns the estimated 
price of an option contract at a certain date prior to expiry.  Second, the 
calculation returns a ratio between stock and option that would create a risk-free 
portfolio.  However, because of the continual price change, that ratio had to be 
recalculated repeatedly and, in order to maintain it, stock had to be bought or sold 
in infinitesimally short intervals whilst incurring transaction costs.   
 
 
The use of Black's sheets 
 
As mentioned above, historical circumstances made options pricing theory and 
exchange-based option trading closely linked. The Chicago Board Options 
                                                 
3 The model is based on the 'no arbitrage' hypothesis which assumes that prices in markets react 
instantly to new information that reaches them and therefore risk-free profit-making opportunities 
are virtually non-existent. In other words, no risk-free arbitrage is possible in financial markets. If 
the 'no arbitrage' assumption were put in a complete market setting, then an asset (or a 
combination of assets - a portfolio) that bears no risk to its holder (risk-free) would have to 
generate the same cash flow as an interest bearing account (which is another risk-free instrument). 
That result also means that the prices of the elements composing a risk-free portfolio could be 
discovered by comparing them with the expected yield of cash invested in a risk-free interest-
bearing account. 
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Exchange (CBOE) started trading options based on 16 ‘blue-chip’ stocks in April 
1973, a few weeks before the Black-Scholes-Merton model was first published. 
Fischer Black, one of the developers of the model, started in 1975 a weekly 
subscription service selling sheets containing options’ calculated prices for that 
week. This first application of the options pricing model was using a 'case by case' 
approach. By calculating a bare-bones Black-Scholes-Merton formula, one option 
contract’s price or hedging ratio was predicted.  
 
Table 2: Sample of data from Black’s sheets*. 
 
Date of expiration 
Last Friday of  
July 1976 
Last Friday of  
October 1976 
Last Friday of  
January 1977 Strike Price: 50.40 
$9.26 $9.53 $10.00 
*The sample shows the prices predicted for the 4th of June 1976 for call options written on stocks 
of US Steel Corporations. Prices were calculated on 25th of May 1976. 
 
CBOE was established by a group originating from Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT), the city’s well-established agricultural commodities exchange 
(MacKenzie, 2000). In its early days, most of CBOE’s traders came from CBOT 
(R4, 2000). Unsurprisingly, the practice that evolved around Black’s sheets was 
based on one of the common trading technique in the Chicago commodities 
markets – scalping. Scalping was a very basic ‘buy low – sell high’ tactic, 
executed many times during a typical trading day and utilizing minute fluctuations 
in prices. With scalping as the main trading technique, the mode of operation of 
this first risk assessment/trading application was as follows: traders calculated the 
theoretical value of one option contract, compared it to the contract’s market 
price, and then decided whether it was profitable to buy or sell. Hence, trading 
while using Black’s sheets can be described as model-aided scalping. The sheets 
supplied pinpointed information to the trader: the model-calculated price of a 
specific option contract on a specific date.  
 
The information provided by the sheets was particularly useful for single traders 
operating on their own for a number of reasons. First, most of them had relatively 
small portfolios5, so they could easily estimate the implication on the entire 
portfolio of selling or buying this or that contract. Second, the part of the portfolio 
that was traded on CBOE (i.e., the options6) was concentrated on the trading pits 
in which the particular trader specialised. This focused approach made the use of 
the sheets easy from yet another aspect: the typical trader had to purchase sheets 
only for a small number of options’ series, and had fewer pieces of paper to carry 
and manage in the crowded trading pits (J, 2000).7 Third, because most trading 
firms had only very small numbers of traders, of which typically only one was the 
senior partner, it was relatively easy to execute single-handed, portfolio-wide 
changes. For example, a small firm could make changes to their positions during 
the trading day in order to utilize price discrepancies between market prices and 
prices calculated in the sheet (Securities and Exchange Commission 1978: 130-6). 
                                                 
4 As several interviewees requested anonymity, they will be identified by a  single letter. All 
quotes were authorized by the interviewees.  
5 Portfolios containing relatively small number of options and stock positions (usually less then a 
hundred), but not necessarily a small amount of money invested in each position. 
6 Stocks were traded in a stock exchange.  During the period discussed in this paper, stocks and 
underlying options were typically traded in the New York Stock Exchange. 
7 J was a trader in CBOE from the early ‘70s onwards. In the late ‘90s he headed the exchange. 
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In many cases, it only took a decision and a quick word between the partner 
traders to change positions in order to take advantage of a price discrepancy. 
During this period, roughly between 1973 and 1977, the reliance on the 
mathematical model as a trading aid was far from being unanimous.  A significant 
number of traders who were veterans of the commodities market from which 
CBOE emerged believed that there was no substitution to the sharp senses and 
instincts that one developed in the trading pits. Indeed, some trades even believed 
that using sheets was a form of ‘cheating’ or an unmanly behaviour (MacKenzie 
& Millo 2003). Nevertheless, the popularity of Black’s sheets was considerable 
and, as options trading changed, opponents of the model gradually became a 
minority. 
 
 
Comprehensive risk management systems  
 
Spreading 
 
Between 1973 and 1977, volumes in options exchanges grew by more than 500% 
and the number of firms doubled (Securities and Exchange Commission 1978). As 
the markets for options flourished, so did the trading firms, which no longer 
employed one or two floor traders, but up to a dozen, along with a similar number 
of clerks, runners and back-office employees (E, 2000). In the larger trading 
firms, portfolio-wide changes could no longer be performed by a single trader.  
Although scalping aided by sheets was still a possible trading strategy, 
coordination among the traders became increasingly important so that the 
different positions’ trading orders would not undermine each other. Gradually, 
bare-boned Black-Scholes-Merton-based applications, like the pre-calculated 
sheets, ceased to serve as devices in their own right and were incorporated into 
larger portfolio management systems. One of the first steps in this direction was a 
Black-Scholes-Merton-based trading practice known as 'spreading' (Securities and 
Exchange Commission 1978). Spreading was a basket term for a variety of 
planning techniques that were all based on the same principle: finding probable 
discrepancies between options’ market prices and between their model-generated 
prices (this was done by computer-programmed calculations of many separate 
positions) and then using those results to devise a daily trading strategy.   
 
The main difference between the sheets and ‘spreading’ lay in the organizational 
setting of the different methods. Usually, traders who used Black's sheets were 
able to take advantage of the market/model price discrepancies only if they 
noticed them during the trading day (J, 2000). On the other hand, spreading was 
planned before the beginning of the trading day at the trading firm’s back office, 
not necessarily by traders themselves. Thus, at the beginning of the day, a trader 
would enter the trading floor, having seen the day’s risk map for the portfolio they 
was trading and thus knowing which options were ‘overpriced’ and which were 
‘underpriced’, according to the model. The daily trading strategy was tailored with 
respect to these predictions. Another difference lay in the nature of information 
that the trades received from the methodologies. Unlike the immediate and highly 
specific information that was provided by the sheets, the typical results of a 
spreading procedure were broader guidelines that stated recommended ranges for 
buying and selling.   
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Spreading, apart from automating the actual position-by-position calculations, 
also created a new stage in the options’ trading design: the computer-generated 
trading day estimates provided market participants with a conceptual and a 
numerical basis for discussion.  Such discussions were an inherent part of the 
spreading procedure because the Black-Scholes-Merton calculations, on their 
own, did not produce definite sets of instructions for the following trading day. 
Instead, the results were discussed alongside other information, risks and 
opportunities were evaluated and an overall picture of the trading day was 
generated. This lead to the design of a recommended daily trading strategy. 
Therefore, spreading marked an important step in the unfolding of the techno-
social process in which Black-Scholes-Merton-based applications gained 
appreciation for their communicative value and gradually transformed from risk 
assessment to risk management. Spreading methodologies enabled trading firms 
to express risks in accessible terms and to construct a clear picture of potential 
market situations and possible reactions. These characteristics were indispensable 
for discussion of risks and for decision-making and became the cornerstone of 
financial risk management model-based applications.  
 
In the early days of option trading in CBOE, much as in the commodities world 
from which it sprang, trading was an expertise that was learned through 
apprenticeship. A trader would typically start her/his career as a floor runner8, a 
job that they would do for 1-2 years before possibly becoming a junior partner and 
perform trades independently. Yet, even as a junior trader, the partner would 
generally seek advice from the more senior partners. In firms where daily trading 
plans were designed with the aid of a spreading application, a new factor was 
added to the decision making process – the input provided by the application. For 
example, an enthusiastic young trader could employ a model-generated result as a 
source of support for a proposed daring trading strategy, frequently against the 
advice of a senior partner. Similarly, referring to a prediction offered by the 
application could bridge over the differences between opinions about the route 
that should be taken in a certain situation. The information coming from the 
application became a computer-generated boundary object - a reference point 
whose communicative value was commonly accepted and was therefore available 
for ‘recruitment’ by all parties in a discussion.  
 
 
Multi-exchange option trading 
 
As options became a more popular financial contract, option trading spread from 
CBOE to other exchanges. By 1977, four other exchanges were also trading 
options: the American Stock Exchange in New York (AMEX), the Pacific Stock 
Exchange in San Francisco (PSE), the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock 
Exchange (PBW) and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLX) (Securities and 
Exchange Commission 1978). Although options trading had gained significant 
popularity, until the mid ‘80s the SEC did not allow for the same option contract 
(i.e. based on the same underlying asset) to be traded in more than one exchange 
and the options were distributed among the exchanges in a ballot. Thus, in order 
to build and maintain a diversified portfolio, traders had to execute trades in many 
exchanges across the country. This fact gave an advantage to the nation-wide 
investment firms (which had traders in all exchanges) at the expense of the local 
                                                 
8 A floor runner’s main task was to deliver order notes to the trader from the back office and 
execution notes from the trader to the bookkeeper. 
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firms that typically traded only in one of the exchanges. The late ‘70s witnessed a 
change in the ecology of the options traders’ population. The Chicago-based firms 
that originated from the commodities trading markets were accompanied by big, 
nation-wide firms that entered options markets as an extension to their securities 
trading (Securities and Exchange Commission 1980).  
 
The entrance of large investment firms did not only change the composition of 
traders on the trading floor; an equally significant change took place in the 
portfolios management practices. The large trading firms typically had huge 
portfolios, containing thousands of positions, distributed among four or five 
different exchanges, and their trading activity was conducted by a few dozen 
traders. When managing a portfolio of such a size, there was little sense in asking 
the question: ‘what are the risks (and opportunities) involved in the current 
positions?’. There were simply too many possible answers to this question to 
serve as a basis for planning a strategy.9 Hence, the communicative challenge 
facing market participants in such an environment was two-fold. First, the highly 
complex information contained in the large portfolios had to be simplified so that 
decision-making could occur. Second, an agreed-upon communicative medium 
describing portfolio risks was necessary so that the various people involved in 
executing trading orders and operating in different cities could coordinate their 
actions.  
 
Facing these organizational challenges, trading firms started to consider a new 
approach to portfolio management.  An approach that, for the first time, managed 
risk directly. Instead of calculating theoretical prices for each of the positions and 
then summing up these results, the new approach took a hypothetical result as its 
starting point. In other words, the operational question of this new risk 
management method was: ‘what if the market drops/rises by X percent tomorrow, 
how would that affect the portfolio?’.  To answer such a question, the 
methodology assumed (in fact, simulated) a market movement of a certain size, 
say of 10%, then calculated the impact that the market movement would have on 
each of the positions, and finally summarized the results so as to come up with the 
overall implication on the portfolio. In essence, the systems simulated possible 
future market scenarios by using results coming from the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model.10  
 
Scenario-simulating systems added a new dimension to the communicative 
function of the boundary objects. The applications not only created a reference 
point for the market participants, but also represented the complex market picture 
in a clear and coherent way. In fact, the communicative efficiency of this new risk 
management methodology was such that even the information still originating 
directly from the markets was ‘mediated’ by model-generated results. For 
example, in order to simplify the positions, these were presented as a percentage 
of the previous day's gain/loss predictions and not as absolute numbers (Securities 
and Exchange Commission 1986). Results from the scenario-simulating systems 
                                                 
9 Large investment companies managed multi-exchange portfolios before exchange-traded options 
appeared. Yet, the level of coordination necessary in options trading was much higher than in 
stock trading as the vast majority of options positions were composite: composed of stock 
positions and one or more option positions that were bought and sold simultaneously, frequently at 
different exchanges. 
10 The general principle behind this methodology was later incorporated into Value at Risk (VaR), 
one of today’s leading financial risk management techniques. 
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became an indispensable mediating step between the market and its participants. 
When using scenario-simulating systems to design their trading strategy, market 
participants were no longer confined to concrete results from the market but were 
able to resort to predicted future situations.  
 
Moreover, scenario-simulating risk management systems transformed the 
communicative possibilities of market participants.  Whereas the use of spreading 
merely enhanced the ability of traders to communicate their ideas about trading 
strategy, the new type of applications became the tools with which such ideas 
were generated in the first place.  When spreading, a trader could only illustrate 
the benefits of the trading strategy she/he had already planned. In contrast, with 
the scenario simulating risk management systems, it became possible, even likely, 
to receive the initial idea about possible trading opportunity by examining the 
application’s output.  Thus, the presentation of scenario simulating technology 
extended the socio-technical role of financial risk management beyond the initial 
definition of boundary objects.  For example, after the proliferation of scenario 
simulating applications, traders started to talk about ‘buying volatility’ or ‘selling 
volatility’, when increasing the relative share of options in their portfolios. That 
is, model-based applications indicated that risky assets of various degrees should 
be bought or sold in order to balance the portfolio. Scenario-simulating did not 
merely supply reference points for discussions; by presenting a new discourse to 
the management of portfolios it made the very existence of such discussions 
possible.  
 
 
Risk management away from the trading floor: Options clearing and the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model 
 
Prices and risks related to options positions were a matter of concern not only for 
the traders, but also for the options clearinghouse (Options Clearing Corporation – 
OCC11) and for the regulator of securities markets, the American Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). In fact, this part of the historical analysis reveals 
aspects of financial risk that do not relate directly to the narrow utility-
maximization assumption that is usually attributed to market participants. 
Moreover, it shows that financial risk management indeed played a vital role as a 
boundary object, not only within the trading community but among other market 
participants as well. The two important actors in the historical narrative, the 
options’ clearinghouse and the SEC were not interested primarily in maximising 
potential profits. Instead, the two bodies were more concerned with the 
organizational and regulatory impacts of financial risk.  
 
Fundamentally, an options clearinghouse ensures that the future obligations of 
buyers and sellers of options (which are embedded in the options contracts) are 
met. To prevent the risk of one of the parties not fulfilling its duties according to 
the contract and to ensure that the market remained liquid and trustworthy, the 
clearinghouse was assigned as the immediate buyer of options from the sellers and 
the immediate seller to buyers.12 As the ‘other side’ of the contracts (until expiry 
                                                 
11 Since OCC was the only options clearinghouse for organized exchanges at the discussed period, 
we refer to it as “the clearinghouse”. 
12 The concept of the modern options clearinghouse was developed by the CBOT team who set up 
the first options exchange. Indeed, the concept of a clearinghouse as an entity separate from the 
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or offsetting), the options’ clearinghouse was exposed to considerable risks. In 
order to protect against those risks, the clearinghouse collected a portion of the 
contracts’ value as collateral, known as margin. Participants had to deposit 
margins when they entered into a contract, and the margins may then either 
decrease or increase according to daily price fluctuations.  
 
Apart from its own margins, OCC was also responsible for the calculation and 
collection of another set of risk-related fees – the SEC’s net capital requirements. 
According to the SEC’s net capital rule13, traders who regularly executed 
transactions for others, collectively known as broker-dealers (or 'brokers')14, were 
required to make daily deposits of specified amounts of money, known as net 
capital. Unlike margins, the net capital rule’s purpose was not to protect the 
clearinghouse, but to protect broker-dealers’ customers in case their funds were 
inadvertently involved in risky positions held by their brokers. If such losses 
occurred, then the pre-deposited capital would be put towards covering them. 
 
In the first three years of its operation, two different methods were used in the 
options clearinghouse for determining the amounts of margins and net capital 
requirements. For the clearinghouse’s own margins, a premium-based method was 
used. That is, a fixed premium was paid regardless of the positions’ components 
(Seligman 1982). The net capital requirements, on the other hand, were calculated 
using a strategy-based method. The strategy-based method of risk-evaluation was 
based on a set of categories that assigned various levels of risk to different 
financial products. For example, options were considered more risky than bonds, 
so the required deposit for options was larger than the one for bonds.  
 
The fact that two separate methods were used for the evaluation of the same factor   
– market risk – caused uneasiness within the trading community. H, who was a 
senior executive at the clearinghouse from the late ‘70s to the mid ‘90s, described 
the early years of option clearing: 
At about 1977-8, OCC had a premium-based margin requirements 
[calculation methodology] and we were barraged with requests to convert 
the margining system to something like the way net capital rule worked at 
the time, which was strategy-based as well. The requests for the changes 
came from the trading community, principally, and they came in with graphs 
and numbers and said something like: 'My risk is limited to this; you should 
never charge me more than this in margins'. (H 2000) 
 
Brokers and other traders, who had to pay both the SEC’s capital requirements 
and the clearinghouse’s margins, demanded the clearinghouse stop charging 
margins according to the premium-based method and to switch to the strategy-
based method (which was already in use in the 1975 revised net capital rule). 
From the traders’ point of view, the premium-based method was problematic 
because it did not reflect the growing complexity embedded in options’ positions 
                                                                                                                                     
trading community, played an important role in the approval of the options exchange itself (R, 
2000) 
13 The rule to which the paper refers is the revised net capital rule from 1975. Prior to the 1975 
amendments (the net capital rule was first written in 1942), brokers had to deposit a set amount of 
capital at the beginning of a trading day, regardless of the risk level associated with their positions 
(Seligman 1982). 
14 The largest group of traders handling accounts of others were broker-dealers, who were 
registered with the SEC, although there were other groups, other than the registered broker-
dealers, who were came under the definition of the net capital rule. 
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and trading methods. Because options were often used to minimize risk levels, 
charging a flat rate for all options positions, regardless of the implied risk 
embedded in them, was defeating the purpose of using options altogether.   
 
Traders were not the only ones who demanded changes in the calculation 
methods. Organized option trading was an emerging and highly competitive 
financial practice in the mid ‘70s, and each of the exchanges that traded options 
wanted to attract customers. Since OCC was the only options clearinghouse at the 
time, it faced demands from all exchanges to charge less for its services. Facing 
those pressures, in 1977 the clearinghouse changed its method for margin 
calculation from a premium-based method to strategy-based one (Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 1986).15 The new calculation method was seen as a 
positive move by both the brokers and the exchanges. However, from the 
clearinghouse’s side, the move entailed some significant problems:  
[The] strategy based approach, intuitively for OCC, would have complicated 
the nightly margin calculation process to such an extent that, because 
everybody was increasing volume on the CBOE, we were worried that we 
would not be able to get the exercising assignment notices and the reports 
out in time16, if we had to calculate margins for the entire market place. 
What they wanted you to do was to take large accounts with all sorts of 
positions and break them down into components, strategies, and minimize 
their margin requirements. Mathematically, it was an optimization problem 
that would have required iterative calculations. (H 2000) 
 
Unlike the premium-based method, in which every transaction was charged a pre-
determined rate and hence was relatively easy to perform, the strategy-based 
method required a more arduous procedure. Each portfolio (typically including 
between 100-200 different options and stocks) had to be broken down to basic 
positions defined in the rule; for each of those positions a risk level17 (in the case 
of net capital requirements) or margin payment were determined and then the 
calculated amounts were summed up, producing the daily margin payment or the 
net capital requirement. Furthermore, because there were several possibilities for 
breaking down complex positions into simple ones, there also existed several 
alternative levels of margin payments. That meant that the clearinghouse had to 
perform an optimization process for each of the portfolios to determine the 
specific splitting of positions that would result in the minimal payment satisfying 
the rule.  This optimization process had to be done nightly so that payments, in or 
out of the trader’s account, could be made in the following morning for the next 
trading day. This placed an enormous pressure on the clearinghouse’s clearing 
system. 
 
Apart from the growing volumes, the increasing sophistication of option trading 
also made the performance of the optimization process increasingly difficult. Even 
before organized option exchanges existed, traders used complex strategies to 
utilize and amplify options’ hedging and leverage abilities.  After the opening of 
CBOE, the organized market, strategies became ever more sophisticated. For 
example, some strategies consisted of simultaneously buying and selling options 
                                                 
15 By doing so the clearinghouse followed the SEC, which had presented a strategy-based method 
for the calculation of net capital requirements two years earlier. 
16 Exercising assignment notices informed trading firms about the amount of daily margin they 
were required to pay. 
17 Risk levels were expressed in the form of ‘haircuts’ – discounts applied to the original value of 
the positions. The riskier the position was, the larger the haircut was. 
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from the same series, but with different strike prices. By creating such positions, 
traders ‘covered’ a range of possible future stock prices at or near expiration date. 
In order to calculate margins and net capital requirements, portfolios had to be 
broken down to basic positions. The more separate strategies there were, the more 
conditions and rules had to be built into the computer programs that performed the 
actual splitting into basic positions. One of the consequences of the increased 
demands from the clearinghouse was that it occasionally attempted to lessen the 
enormous workload by ‘simplifying’ the strategies. Instead of following all the 
possible routes in order to find the minimal net capital requirements in a complex 
portfolio, simpler positions were chosen and portfolios were charged accordingly: 
…and then you have First Options [a firm for which OCC did the clearing] 
who would have 800 large portfolios to clear and they [OCC] have to do it 
account by account. So it involves a lot of computing power. They would 
just say: ‘We’re not going to do that one. We’ll just ignore that strategy 
because it involves six more permutations.’…And the market maker [trader] 
will get angry or would question them and say: ‘Look. If I’m doing it then 
my real risk is that and you’re charging me for this.” (M 2001)18 
 
Such disputes were often not resolved between the clearinghouse and the traders. 
The CBOE (being a self-regulatory organization19) was often called in to 
intervene and mediate. As options strategies became more complex, such disputes 
broke more often and this, in turn, added yet another burden to the Market 
Regulation Division. 
 
The clearinghouse’s problems were reflected, in part, by the SEC. Each time a 
new strategy was presented by traders, SEC had to examine it according to the net 
capital requirements to see if the proposed strategy complied with the rule’s 
definitions. During the mid to late ‘70s, many of the major American broker firms 
expanded into option markets, causing portfolios’ designs to get steadily more 
complex, and thus making the rule’s maintenance work more cumbersome and 
time-consuming. The rapid growth in options’ trading volumes created a situation 
in which some personnel at the division responsible for market regulation at the 
SEC20 spent much of their time adjusting the net capital rule to the flux of new 
portfolio strategies.  This situation was a cause for much concern in the division, 
since one of the main purposes of the net capital rule’s 1975 amendments was to 
make the determination of net capital requirements more straightforward and 
efficient. M describes it as: 
Our role had gotten so complicated when strategies have constantly been 
replaced with other strategies. It has become very hard to function in that 
environment. No matter what you did, there would be another one [trading 
strategy]. (M 2001) 
 
As a result of the trends described above, concern was developing about the 
discrepancy between the sophistication of portfolio-construction methods 
                                                 
18 M was a senior attorney at the SEC's division of Market Regulation from the early ‘70s to the 
mid ‘90s. 
19 According to the American securities law, national securities exchanges and their 
clearinghouses are considered self-regulatory organizations. That is, some of the monitoring, 
supervising and rule-making functions otherwise performed by the SEC are delegated, in the case 
of self-regulatory organisations, to departments within the organization.  
20 The division of market regulation was in charge of overseeing trading and clearing practices. 
As such, the division was in charge of applying the changes made in the net capital rule and also 
for designing, along with the self-regulatory organizations (the exchanges), new risk evaluation 
methods. 
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displayed by trading firms and between the relatively crude risk-evaluation 
practices that were imposed by the regulator:  
I would hear [complaints about clearing], but what were we going to do? I 
mean, that was the rule. They were the ones who wanted the complicated 
strategies. I wasn’t the one saying: ‘I want you to do these complicated 
strategies.’ They wanted to do them. They would, obviously, then have to do 
the work. (M 2001) 
 
That discrepancy was rooted in the different viewpoints the SEC and the other 
market participants (i.e. trading firms, the clearinghouse and the exchanges) held 
regarding risk management. From the regulatory point of view, risk management 
was intended to protect customers by collecting ‘back up’ funds in the case of a 
loss, and such money was indeed collected by the clearinghouse. Since the funds 
were not expected to cover fully the losses in any case, the exact amount was of 
little significance as long as it was above the set minimum.21 Therefore, for the 
SEC, a strictly exact measurement of risk was less important than the fact that a 
rule positively defining the collection net capital was followed. In contrast, from 
the traders’ point of view, sophisticated portfolio strategies were critical in 
achieving an advantage over competitors. Hence, a relatively crude net capital rule 
would have undermined such purpose: there would not be much use to employ 
sophisticated strategies if those were treated as simple ones and incurred high net 
capital requirements. The aforementioned combination of factors - high volume of 
trades, sophisticated strategies and a lagging regulator - lead the clearinghouse in 
the late ‘70s to look for alternatives for the existing margin calculation 
mechanism. 
 
 
Financial risk management and options clearing 
 
In the early ‘80s, two of CBOE’s prominent trading firms (Chicago Research and 
Trading, and O’Connor & Associates) were using scenario-simulating risk 
management systems. When H and his team in the OCC started to examine 
alternatives for the strategy-based margin calculation system, they quickly 
encountered the new technology: 
I was going to grad school and one of my grad school teachers was also a 
CBOE market maker [trader] and he taught me options price theory and I 
started to talk to him. The idea was worth a try and we convinced the board 
[of the clearinghouse] that they should fund some study. [An external 
company] began to calculate potential theoretical values for us on a daily 
basis for all the options series for a one year period and internally we built 
this program that would calculate a margin requirement equal to the worst 
possible loss on a line by line basis. We ran that for a year, then we wrote 
another report to our margin committee. (H 2000) 
 
The system developed by the OCC applied a similar scenario-simulating principle 
to the one traders used to design trading strategies for the calculation of required 
margins. While trading firms wanted to estimate the maximal daily loss in order to 
minimize it, the clearinghouse used the calculated figure as the required daily 
margin deposit. These two different set of uses outline the emergence of financial 
risk management as a boundary object. OCC and the trading firms were two 
different market participants and had different agendas to promote, yet both chose 
                                                 
21 The minimum value of net capital for registered broker-dealers (after their first year as broker-
dealers) was set at $250,000 or as 6 2/3% of the total debts (SEC 1975)  
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the same technological approach to do so.  This, however, was only the beginning 
of a more complicated historical picture. In the quote above, H described the 
beginning stages of a process that lasted more than 10 years. In the late ‘70s and 
early ‘80s, the movement to model-based practices took place mainly within the 
broker firms, and the clearinghouse joined in only later. Trading firms were 
relatively quick to implement model-based systems for a number of reasons. First, 
as options markets became more competitive, innovative practices that had the 
potential to improve the effectiveness of trading were eagerly adopted.  
 
Second, between 1973 and 1979, option trading was given the status of an SEC 
pilot programme and both CBOE and the clearinghouse were subject to extremely 
close SEC supervision. The pilot programme status meant that for every change to 
the trading or clearing practices, prior approval from the SEC was needed. 
Trading firms were not subject to such close SEC scrutiny as OCC and CBOE and 
could therefore implement trading systems without receiving prior approval from 
the SEC.   
  
Third, CBOE’s organizational structure was also related to the elaborated 
implementation process of the proposed risk management systems. H mentioned 
that he needed to receive approval from CBOE’s margin committee to run a 
feasibility study and to report to this committee. After proposals were submitted 
to the committees, making a decision involved political manoeuvring and 
lobbying to ensure majority in the committees’ votes.  
 
The clearinghouse, being a self-regulatory organization, was required to submit to 
the SEC proposals describing the nature of changes it made to its rules. As part of 
the reporting process, the clearinghouse was required to publicly request 
comments for the proposed changes and to report on the comments received. 
Between December 1985 and April 1986, proposals were submitted by the 
clearinghouse regarding its new margining system (Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 1986a; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1986b). From a 
strictly legal point , these rule changes were an internal matter of the 
clearinghouse and the public inspection process was more of a formality than a 
substantive procedure. However, it has to be mentioned that the SEC was 
extremely cautious with regard to approving new practices and rules. Therefore, 
from a sociological and a political point of view, the fact that the rule was not 
rejected indicated that the SEC implicitly accepted the use of mathematical 
models in regulatory risk management, although it was yet to pass judgement on 
its own net capital rule. 
 
By 1986, model-based applications had developed into an effective boundary 
object that served both the trading community and the clearinghouse.  Traders 
continually negotiated their margin levels with the clearinghouse.  Typically, the 
two parties had different opinions about the levels of risks embedded in this or 
that position. However, because both sides agreed on the method in which risk 
was measured and represented, communicating the different opinions to each 
other became less problematic. Consequently, both the clearinghouse and traders 
had stakes in the promotion of the model-based financial risk management 
system.  Traders based their co-ordinated trading activity on it and the 
clearinghouse found in the model-based margining system an answer to volume 
and complexity challenges.  SEC’s point of view on the applications was 
different.  It is true that the increasingly popular options markets had brought 
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about an explosive growth in trading strategies and those had to be approved by 
the SEC, but essentially the net capital rule system functioned properly - money 
was collected from brokers, and investors (as far as the SEC could judge) were 
given protection.  While the clearinghouse and the traders were relying on model-
based applications and were eager to extend their use, the common opinion at the 
SEC about the application was still sceptical.  Paradoxically enough, the event 
that helped to persuade the SEC to approve model-based applications for net 
capital rule calculation and join the model-based communicative community was 
an event in which dozens of broker firms went bankrupt - the October 1987 
market crash.  
 
 
Risk management and the 1987 market crash: the boundary object is put to 
the test 
 
By October 1987, risk management systems based on Black-Scholes-Merton were 
present in virtually all of the major broker firms’ offices as well as in options 
clearinghouses. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Black-Scholes-
Merton-based22 systems were the de facto risk management standard in option 
markets. On Monday 19 October 1987, American financial markets experienced 
the worst one-day drop in asset prices since October 1929. Since stock prices 
dropped sharply, options (which were designed to lessen the effect of such 
situations) were in extremely high demand (Brady, 1988). Furthermore, because 
many investors were selling stocks to try to cut their losses, price volatility 
reached record levels.  Many pieces of evidence show that between the 19th and 
the 22nd of October 1987 Black-Scholes-Merton-based applications did not 
calculate prices and volatility correctly. In fact, in a few cases it was reported that 
the computer systems displayed call option prices that were higher than the 
market price of the stock for which the option was written (M 2001).23 
 
Although this paper does not discuss the possible theoretical reasons why the 
models were not reliable in October 1987, it has to be said that some of the basic 
premises on which the model was established were questioned, if not shaken, 
because of the events. Among the questionable assumptions was the validity of 
the hypothesis that prices followed a lognormal distribution. Based on the 
lognormal distribution is the assumption that the ‘further’ an event is from the 
mean, the less likely it is to occur. On the 19th of October 1987, it appeared that 
the assumption about the lognormal distribution of prices did not hold. For 
instance, events that had very low probabilities and, thus, were expected to occur 
very rarely (i.e. once in a few decades) happened a few times a day (Rubinstein, 
1994). For many market participants it became apparent that under such extreme 
conditions24 model-based financial risk management was not predicting and 
managing risk appropriately. 
 
                                                 
22 Another pricing model, based on the same mathematical assumptions of the Black-Scholes was 
developed by John Cox, Stephen Ross, and Mark Rubinstein (Cox, Ross & Rubinstein 1979; Ross 
1977; Rubinstein 1994) and gained significant popularity during the time period described in this 
paper. 
23 This last point refers directly to the materiality of the network that performed risk management: 
the theoretical model could have produced such an effect; it was the interaction between model-
based computerized applications and live traders that brought it about.  
24
  For example, the NYSE dropped 21% on 19 October, its biggest one day drop since the 1920s. 
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The first Black-Scholes-Merton-based risk management system was approved for 
the calculation of SEC’s net capital requirements in 1994 (Securities and 
Exchange Commission 1994, 1997). The system was dubbed TIMS - Theoretical 
Intermarket Margining System. The SEC issued a ‘no-action’ letter about the use 
of TIMS in 1994 (Securities and Exchange Commission). The meaning of the 
letter was that no action would be taken against bodies that used TIMS. The final, 
unrestricted approval of the system was granted in 1997 (Securities and Exchange 
Commission). Remembering that for the better part of the ‘80s the market 
regulation division of the SEC did not approve such systems, one might ask what 
made the SEC approve TIMS when it did. This question becomes even more 
pointed when we consider that between 1984 (when the margining system was 
first introduced to the SEC) and 1994 (when TIMS was approved), the October 
1987 market break took place. Knowing only these facts, it would seem that an 
event like the October 1987 market crash is not likely to motivate any regulator to 
support model-based applications. However, the October 1987 crash and its effect 
on the regulatory approval of Black-Scholes-Merton-based applications should be 
examined according to the role that those applications were playing in the techno-
social environment of financial risk management. 
 
The problems that the Black-Scholes-Merton-based applications faced in October 
1987 were given different interpretations by the different communities that were 
related to the events. M was an assistant director in the SEC’s division of market 
regulation in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s; while in this position M headed the team 
that examined the OCC’s system that was later to be dubbed TIMS. The 
examination of the system took several months between 1990 and 1991, in which 
time the SEC and the OCC conducted comparative performance tests between 
TIMS and of the existing strategy-based calculation method. At the completion of 
the tests, it was concluded that TIMS provided more reliable and accurate results 
than those produced by the strategy-based system. That is, TIMS predicted daily 
gain/loss amounts that were closer to the actual market results than the ones 
determined by the strategy-based system. However, the test period was a time of 
relative calm in the markets and so TIMS was not tested during periods of 
extreme volatility such as those that existed in October 1987. The results meant 
that under ordinary market conditions TIMS would provide appropriate amounts 
of net capital, but what would happen in times of extreme market conditions?  The 
SEC’s answer to this question was simple:        
[TIMS] is good for business purposes. Obviously, a businessman should 
know what his risk is from day to day. He should also have an idea of what 
the worst thing that could happen to him, more or less. [I]n the ordinary 
circumstance, not much capital is needed from day to day. You only need it 
in stress times. Stress times don’t occur that frequently. So the model is 
always wrong! Because it will not give that stress capital. (M 2001) 
 
M, like many other market participants was aware of the fact that under extreme 
conditions Black-Scholes-Merton-based applications did not provide accurate 
results.  Equally, the SEC’s staff was aware of the fact that virtually all of the 
market participants used similar systems. From a regulative point of view, it was 
more important to approve a system that was acceptable by all market participants 
(albeit unreliable under infrequent extreme conditions) than to have a system 
(strategy-based rules) that was resented by most of the market participants.25 This 
                                                 
25 This duality brings to mind Bloor's analysis (Bloor, 1978) of the reactions to social anomaly 
(comparing Imré Lakatos’ and Mary Douglas’ approaches). 
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argument is rooted deeply in the SEC’s regulative worldview and, in particular, 
the intention behind the net capital rule. The rule was designed to protect 
customers from the possible adverse consequences of positions they did not 
explicitly intend to hold. That is, if a broker constructed risky positions using 
customer’s money without the direct intention of the customers and the positions 
resulted in a loss, the customers were entitled to compensation. However, in times 
of extreme volatility, when prices in the markets as a whole fluctuate wildly, even 
conservative positions could be risky. In other words, the net capital rule was not 
designed to protect market participants from events of the type that occurred in 
October 1987. Therefore, from this perspective it was of little significance that the 
model used in the rule was inaccurate when such events happened. 
 
When the SEC tested TIMS in the early ‘90s, Black-Scholes-Merton-based 
applications had already served as the agreed-upon communicative and 
organizational basis for option trading and for the calculation of margins by the 
clearinghouse. The regulatory approval of TIMS, like the approval given to CBOE 
in the early 70s, indicated not only that the preferences of the SEC regarding 
options markets changed, but also that a more fundamental change took place. 
The dominance of model-related practices in the options market environment had 
a significant impact on the SEC’s perspective of the markets. In particular, the 
concept of the ‘common businessman’ was influenced by the awareness that the 
model had become the common language in the market. When M, the SEC’s 
senior employee, mentioned that ‘a businessman should know what his risk is 
from day to day’, he did not merely make a normative conviction that was based 
on the rules and the regulations of the SEC, but one that draws its power from a 
more general set of values. That is, market participants should know what risks 
they are facing every day because this is the optimal way for action in markets to 
be conducted – ‘it is good for business purposes’. In other words, the use of 
model-based tools and practices no longer represented only the interests of one 
group of market participants or another. By this stage, model-based risk 
management had became a social and technological fact, part of the taken-for-
granted reality of options markets. 
 
The suggestion that TIMS, like other Black-Scholes-Merton-based applications, 
was more important for the organizational and social role it played in the markets 
than for its accuracy is potentially strengthened by yet another finding. Following 
the unreliable results that the Black-Scholes-Merton model produced under the 
extreme volatility of 1987, in the early ‘90s OCC developed a version of TIMS 
that did not depend on the Black-Scholes-Merton model’s lognormal random walk 
(Hinkes, personal communication). In this newer system, OCC made use of 
another set of statistical distributions, the stable Lévy distributions with infinite 
variance, in which extreme events like the ones of October 1987 are far more 
likely to occur than on the system based on the lognormal distribution. The 
margining system based on the stable Lévy distribution has the virtue that sudden 
increases in price volatility, because they are ‘expected’ by the distribution, do not 
lead to sudden, and large increases in margin demands. This version of TIMS (like 
the NEO system in the mid ‘80s) is used for the calculating of OCC’s own 
margins and therefore did not require a regulatory approval of the SEC. 
Nevertheless, as of late 2002, the SEC’s own net capital requirements were still 
calculated according to the Black-Scholes-Merton-based system. As the historical 
narrative presented so far shows, from the SEC’s regulatory perspective it is more 
beneficial to help to maintain and preserve institutionalized market practices that 
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constitute a successful communicative network than to replace them with new 
practices, albeit those being arguably more accurate and valid. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper analyzed the emergence of financial risk management in derivatives 
markets, by exploring how options markets developed gradually into a 
heterogeneous techno-social network; a network in which computerized risk 
management systems played a pivotal role.  The development of ties that 
constituted the market network was related to the development of an 
organizational communicative layer among the actors. As the findings show, the 
evolution of the network connections led to the organizational and technological 
infrastructure of the market becoming dependent on model-based applications. As 
risk management gradually became the standard descriptive and analytical 
language among market participants, the constitutive power of the communicative 
layer increased substantially. By the early ‘80s, options markets had become a 
heterogeneous techno-social network in which there existed no other method to 
assess risk and act according to the assessments - other than using model-based 
risk management ‘language’. At that stage, the dependence on the institutionalized 
financial risk management was so profound that the communicative and 
organizational benefits of the procedures became equally important to the 
reliability and accuracy of the mathematical model on which the risk management 
was based. 
 
The main analytical tool used in the paper was the concept of boundary objects. 
The case analyzed indicated that financial risk management, with its universal 
‘risk language’, had turned into an effective form of mediating representation that 
accommodated conflicting organizational demands. The question that may now 
arise concerns the ability to draw conclusions that are more general from this case. 
That is, should we expect to find such boundary objects in the histories of other 
risk management systems? This paper, on its own, cannot provide a sufficient 
answer to this question. The co-evolution of modern, organized options markets 
and financial risk management and the formation of the latter as a boundary object 
is a result of a unique historical set of circumstances that created, in effect, a 
natural laboratory. The derivative market and the mathematical model describing 
the contracts traded in that market (and on the basis of which the particular risk 
management methodology evolved) came about almost simultaneously. This 
historical coincidence enables us to frame explicitly and accurately the potential 
causal scope of the interactions among the actors that took part in the creation of 
financial risk management. Consequently, this allows us to draw conclusions 
about the reasons behind the popularity of the methodology and about the nature 
of its accuracy. Sadly, such conditions are impossible to replicate and very seldom 
occur naturally. However, this does not mean that boundary objects evolved only 
in this case. Indeed, what this case study shows us (and this is a potential way to 
generalize from it) is that risk management, by becoming an effective boundary 
object, turned into the common language of the market. Moreover, perhaps, to 
assess the potential future success of a risk management methodology we should 
examine not only its predictive abilities, but equally (and perhaps even more so), 
we should pay attention to the nature of communication that the methodology 
encourages and the types of organizational and inter-organizational contacts that 
evolve as a result.  
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The paper focused primarily on the history of Black-Scholes-Merton-based 
financial risk management and on its ascendance into the dominant position it 
currently holds. Yet, as mentioned in the paper, in the early years of options 
trading, the Black-Scholes-Merton model faced considerable resistance. The 
different trading schools practiced different calculation methodologies that, at 
least at that stage, competed with the Black-Scholes-Merton model. Considering 
this fact in light of the historical analysis above, the following question can be 
asked: what are the reasons for the success of Black-Scholes-Merton over the 
other models? To answer this question, it is important to see when exactly, and for 
what reasons, the different risk management models started following divergent 
historical paths. In the early ‘70s, both the Black-Scholes-Merton application 
(Black’s sheets) and its competitors were all risk management methodologies that 
suited the individual trader. Yet, being a mathematical formula (unlike its 
competitors), the Black-Scholes-Merton model was incorporated easily into 
computerized systems, which gradually became the communicative and 
managerial backbone of trading systems in the changing market environment. The 
other methodologies, which were qualitative in nature, were not incorporated into 
the socio-technical network that became financial risk management and remained 
methodologies for the individual trader. This brief comment is intended to 
highlight a potentially promising future direction of study within this evolving 
field.   
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